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Between a Rock and a Hard Place
WHY RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY FOR LGBT
CLASSIFICATIONS IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH
OPPOSITION TO LGBT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder
announced in a letter to members of Congress that President
Obama had directed the Justice Department to stop defending
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in a number
of legal challenges addressing its adverse impact on gays and
lesbians.1 The Attorney General went a step further in
announcing another change in the administration’s position:
“[G]iven a number of factors, including documented history of
discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation should
be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.”2 In response,
Speaker John Boehner announced that the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group (BLAG) would defend the law in the
administration’s stead.3 BLAG supported a rational basis
standard of review for classifications based on sexual orientation.4
Supporters of gay rights celebrated President Obama’s
sudden policy shift. Anthony D. Romero, executive director of
the American Civil Liberties Union, stated that “[t]his is a
great step by the Obama administration and a tipping point for
the gay rights movement that will have ripple effects . . . . It
1 Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says Marriage Act
Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011 at A1.
2 Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the
Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from the Attorney General],
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html.
3 Frank James & Liz Halloran, Boehner: House Will Defend DOMA; Courts, Not
Obama, Should Decide, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 4, 2011, 3:52 PM), http://www.npr.org/
blogs/itsallpolitics/2011/03/04/134268656/boehner-house-will-defend-doma-courts-notobama-should-decide.
4 Ruthann
Robson, What’s Rational About Rational Basis Review?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 17, 2011, 8:41 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/what%
E2%80%99s-rational-about-rational-basis-review/ (“The Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group of the United States House of Representatives (BLAG), defending DOMA in
Windsor, filed its Memorandum on August 1, vigorously asserting that rational basis is
the correct standard and that DOMA easily satisfies it.”).
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will reach into issues of employment discrimination, family
recognition and full equality rights for lesbian and gay people.”5
Former Congressman Barney Frank saw the administration’s
change of position as “a sign of and a result of the fact that gay
prejudice is being defeated by gay reality.”6 While heightened
scrutiny would certainly increase the chance of future victories
against discriminatory laws assessed under that standard, for
the past two decades the Supreme Court has wielded scrutiny
analysis as a double-edged sword.
At a time when the viability of race-based affirmative
action programs was at risk in the Supreme Court’s review last
term of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,7 opponents of
LGBT nondiscrimination laws continued to raise the specter of
the inevitability of affirmative action programs for gays and
lesbians.8 On October 12, 2012, Peter LaBarbera, president of
Americans for Truth About Homosexuality, joined Religious
Right talk show host Janet Mefferd on her daily radio show.9
When the conversation turned to a job posting for bodyguards at
the U.S. embassy in Libya that allegedly gave preference to United
States government employees with same-sex domestic partners,10
LaBarbera said, “I didn’t know that when Barack Obama was
campaigning in 2008 that he was going to give us gay affirmative
action, don’t you think that would have been an interesting point?
Savage & Stolberg, supra note 1.
Donovan Slack & Michael Levenson, Obama Rejects Defense of Marriage
Act, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/
articles/2011/02/24/obama_rejects_defense_of_marriage_act.
7 See Adam Liptak, College Diversity Nears Its Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16, 2011, at SR4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/sunday-review/
college-diversity-nears-its-last-stand.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
8 Hans Bader, Obama Administration Seeks Quotas Based on Disability,
Race, and Perhaps Sexual Orientation, OPENMARKET.ORG (Mar. 2, 2012),
http://www.openmarket.org/2012/03/02/obama-administration-seeks-quotas-based-ondisability-race-and-perhaps-sexual-orientation/.
9 Janet Mefferd Show-10/12/2012, THE JANET MEFFERD SHOW, (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.janetmefferdpremium.com/2012/10/12/janet-mefferd-radio-show-20121012-hr-3/.
10 Mefferd first said that the job posting “explicitly stated that they would give
preference to filling these positions with qualified US citizens who were family members of
US government employees and this included those with same-sex domestic partners,” but
later asked, “[a]nd the silly part about it is why would you give preference to somebody who
is a homosexual to be a security guard, what is the connection there?” Brian Tashman,
LaBarbera: ‘Dictator Obama’ Championing ‘Gay Affirmative Action’, RIGHT WING WATCH
(Oct. 15, 2012, 12:05 PM), http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/labarbera-dictatorobama-gay-affirmative-action. Media Matters for America reported that the job application
stated that “preference [would be] given to veterans and family members of government
employees, a category which includes same-sex spouses.” Andy Newbold, Limbaugh Peddles
Hysteria over Possibility That Libya Embassy Was Recruiting Gay People, MEDIA MATTERS
FOR AMERICA (Oct. 11, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/10/11/limbaughpeddles-hysteria-over-possibility-that/190561. “[T]he job posting . . . does not list same-sex
domestic partners of government employees as a prerequisite.” Id.
5

6
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Hey, who is in favor of affirmative action based on aberrant,
deviant sexual conduct?”11 A day earlier, Rush Limbaugh had
reported on his radio show that the job posting “solicited for samesex couples . . . . [T]hey gave preference to citizens, same-sex
domestic partners of U.S. government employees.”12
The irony, of course, is that the language in the job
posting that became a right-wing talking point was not related
to a lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)13 affirmative
action program, but was rather the result of federal
nondiscrimination law.14 In a 1993 article, Jeffrey S. Byrne noted
that “[w]hen the issue of affirmative action for gay and lesbian
people is raised at all, it is almost always mentioned as a feared
result of enacting antidiscrimination laws . . . ”15 Although
mention of LGBT affirmative action has been sparse over the
past decade, the possibility of it becoming law acted as a black
cloud over the gay rights dialogue of the early 1990s, giving
opponents of gay rights ammunition in the form of a buzzword:
“special rights.”16 “[M]any people oppose gay demands for ‘equal
rights’ because they saw similar demands from blacks and
women, [which] they supported, morph into demands for
preferential treatment, which they oppose.”17 Some states and
Janet Mefferd Show-10/12/2012, supra note 9.
Newbold, supra note 10.
13 Although this note uses the term LGBT broadly to refer to sexual
orientation, the legal status of transgender status and gender identity in the context of
antidiscrimination and equal protection is often treated separately from that of sexual
orientation. See, e.g., Chris Geidner, Transgender Breakthrough, METROWEEKLY (Apr.
23, 2012, 10:38 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/news/?ak=7288 (discussing a
decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interpreting solely genderidentity discrimination into the language of Title VII.) For a more detailed analysis of
the legal status of gender identity under the equal protection clause and Title VII, see
Gwen Havlik, Note, Equal Protection for Transgendered Employees? Analyzing the
Court’s Call for More than Rational Basis in the Glenn v. Brumby Decision, 28 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1315 (2012).
14 Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-06-02/pdf/98-14689.pdf; see also U.S. EQUAL
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION,
STATUS AS A PARENT, MARITAL STATUS AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION (2009), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/upload/otherprotections.pdf.
15 Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal for
True Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 47 (1993).
16 See generally Jeffrey S. Byrne & Bruce R. Deming, On the Prudence of
Discussing Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: Community, Strategy and
Equality, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 177, 177 (1993) (“Would proposing affirmative action
for lesbians and gay men fuel the already successful ‘special rights’ rhetoric of those
who oppose gay and lesbian civil rights?”); Samuel A. Marcosson, The “Special Rights”
Canard in the Debate Over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 137, 137 (1995) (Analyzing and proposing counterarguments to the specter
of “special rights” when used as a weapon by opponents of gay rights).
17 “Attributes”
For
Gays?,
DISCRIMINATIONS
(Oct.
10,
2006),
http://www.discriminations.us/2006/10/affirmative-action-”attributes”-for-gays/.
11

12
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municipalities that have passed nondiscrimination laws that
include affirmative action requirements included carve-outs for
sexual orientation from affirmative action programs, ostensibly to
allay such concerns.18 On the federal stage, the Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA), a proposed bill that has been
introduced in varying forms in almost every Congress since 1994,19
has failed in part due to fears that it would require employers to
take affirmative action in employing gays and lesbians.20
What opponents of affirmative action based on sexual
orientation fail to consider, and what this note seeks to
illustrate, is that the Obama administration’s newfound
position in support of heightened scrutiny,21 if successful, will
prove to be a limiting factor for the viability of such affirmative
action programs. And opponents of gay rights (and, certainly,
LGBT affirmative action) that argue for a rational basis
standard for classifications based on sexual orientation would
18 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-33 (2007) (“Except with respect to
affectional or sexual orientation and gender identity or expression, the contractor will
take affirmative action to ensure that such applicants are recruited and employed, and
that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their age, race,
creed, color, national origin, ancestry, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation,
gender identity or expression, disability, nationality or sex.” (emphasis added)); 1991
N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 519 (West) (“Although the bill would prohibit discrimination
in employment on the basis of affectional or sexual orientation, the bill would not
require affirmative action programs to recruit or employ persons solely based on their
affectional or sexual orientation.”); see also Christy Mallory & Brad Sears, An
Evaluation of Local Laws Requiring Government Contractors to Adopt NonDiscrimination and Affirmative Action Policies to LGBT Employees at 4-5, WILLIAMS
INSTITUTE (Feb. 2012), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/
Mallory-Sears-Govt-Contractors-Non-Discrim-Feb-2012.pdf (“Of the 61 localities with
sexual orientation or gender identity contractor nondiscrimination ordinances, 35 do not
require contractors to take ‘affirmative action’ or recruitment outreach steps with respect to
any characteristic, including race and sex . . . . Four of the 61 localities exclude sexual
orientation and gender identity from their ‘affirmative action’ or recruitment outreach
ordinances, although they do have these requirements for other protected groups such as
racial minorities and women.”).
19 See History of Nondiscrimination Bills in Congress, NATIONAL GAY &
LESBIAN TASK FORCE, http://www.thetaskforce.org/issues/nondiscrimination/timeline
(last visited Dec. 23, 2013); FAQ: The Employee Non-Discrimination Act: What You
Need to Know, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/lgbt/news/2011/07/19/9988/faq-the-employment-non-discrimination-act/#r1 (last
visited Dec. 23, 2013).
20 John S. Rosenberg, Is Another Furor over Religious Liberty Coming?,
MINDING THE CAMPUS (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.mindingthecampus.com/originals/
2012/03/is_another_furor_over_religiou.html (“Supporters at one point tried to assuage
this concern by adding language (quoted from Section 4(f) of S. 811, Apr. 2011) barring
preferential treatment to correct ‘an imbalance which may exist with respect to the
total number or percentage of persons of any actual or perceived sexual orientation or
gender identity employed by any employer,’ but the attempt failed because opponents
pointed out that preferential treatment for other reasons—such as to provide
‘diversity’—would still be allowed.”).
21 Letter from the Attorney General, supra note 2.
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instead do well to agree to a higher scrutiny standard for
sexual orientation. Though such a shift would concede the fight
for nondiscrimination protections for LGBT individuals,
shifting demographics and public opinion suggest that
discriminatory laws are a lost cause.22
Instead, support for rational basis poses greater risks
for conservatives: discriminatory laws continue to be struck
down under that standard, whereas affirmative action based on
sexual orientation would more likely be upheld.23 Recognizing
that the Supreme Court employs scrutiny analysis as a doubleedged sword, a move toward support of heightened scrutiny
would at least reserve fewer options for crafting a viable
affirmative action program based on sexual orientation.24
Under current law, embracing a strict scrutiny standard for
both gender and sexual orientation would actually benefit
opponents of affirmative action. This position would eliminate
the existing legal paradox that makes it easier to legally defend
affirmative action programs based on gender, and likely sexual
orientation, as opposed to those based on race.25
Part I of this note discusses current events involving
sexual orientation-based affirmative action. Part II surveys the
current jurisprudence to determine the level of scrutiny
currently applied to classifications based on sexual orientation
by the Supreme Court and other lower federal courts. Part III
examines how the Supreme Court has dealt with race-based
affirmative action programs in employment and education.
Part IV examines how lower federal courts have examined
gender-based affirmative action programs under heightened
scrutiny and strict scrutiny. Part V looks to how the
constitutionality of a sexual orientation-based affirmative action
program examined under a strict or heightened scrutiny
analysis might differ from a program assessed under rational
basis analysis and concludes that opponents of both LGBT rights
and affirmative action are in an untenable position based on
Supreme Court scrutiny jurisprudence. They are losing the
nondiscrimination battle to changing demographics and public

22 Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage is Changing, and What it
Means,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(N.Y.
TIMES
Mar.
26,
2013
10:10
AM),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-opinion-on-same-sex-marriageis-changing-and-what-it-means/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
23 See infra Part V.
24 See infra Part V.
25 See infra Part V.
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opinion, and their stated preference for rational basis scrutiny
does not bode well for a potential affirmative action battle.
I.

IS THERE SUCH A THING AS LGBT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?
Things I’m not worried about: LGBT affirmative action. A bizarre
article appeared this morning on The Advocate’s website, by gay
conservative James Kirchick, denouncing LGBT affirmative action.
The first thing that’s bizarre about the article is that it’s denouncing
LGBT affirmative action. I don’t know anyone who’s proposing that,
any municipality that’s discussing an LGBT affirmative action
program, or any school or business thinking about doing that. We
can’t even get [the Employment Non-Discrimination Act] passed, so
no one’s thinking about affirmative action. So weird.26

Affirmative action programs based on sexual orientation
are very limited in range and scope and frequently arise within
broader government contracting requirements.27 Yet as
demographics shift and public opinion changes—resulting in gay
and lesbian civil rights victories28—the enactment of sexual
orientation-based affirmative action programs in the
employment and educational domains becomes more plausible.29
On January 13, 2012, the Center for American Progress
(CAP) and the Williams Institute presented Diego Sanchez,
then Congressman Barney Frank’s Senior Legislative Adviser,
with a memo presenting their research on a potential executive
branch remedy to stall legislation on LGBT workplace
discrimination.30 The memo detailed how amending Executive
Order (EO) 1124631 to include protections for LGBT Americans
26 Alex Blaze, Things I’m Not Worried About: LGBT Affirmative Action,
BILERICO PROJECT (Feb. 9, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.bilerico.com/2010/02/
a_bizarre_article_appeared_this.php.
27 See Mallory & Sears, supra note 18.
28 See, e.g., Chris Geidner, With Unprecedented Gay Victories, U.S. Looks
Wedded to Change, BUZZFEED (Nov. 8, 2012, 4:02 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
chrisgeidner/with-unprecedented-gay-victories-us-looks-wedde; see also Chris Geidner,
The Seven States (Or More) That Could See Marriage Equality in 2013, BUZZFEED
(Dec. 24, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/the-seven-states-ormore-that-could-see-marriage.
29 For a more detailed discussion of LGBT protections in employment and policy
proposal for affirmative action, see Ryan H. Nelson, Affirmative Action for LGBT Applicants
& Employees: A Proposed Regulatory Scheme, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 179 (2012).
30 See Chris Geidner, Advocates Lay Out Case for Obama Contractor Executive
Order in Memo to Rep. Barney Frank, METROWEEKLY (Feb. 4, 2012, 9:00 PM),
http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/02/advocates-lay-out-case-for-oba.html;
Memo,
LGBT Equality in Government Contracting, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS & THE WILLIAMS
INSTITUTE (Jan. 13, 2012) [hereinafter LGBT Equality in Government Contracting], available
at http://metroweekly.com/poliglot/CAP-Williams%20Inst%20Jan%2013%20memo.pdf.
31 EO 11246 was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965.
Exec. Order No. 11246 § 202(1), 30 F.R. 12319 (1965) (“The contractor will not
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would accomplish some of the groundwork of ENDA.32 The
executive order requires the Department of Labor’s Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs to “ensure[ ] that all
federal contractors doing more than $10,000 in government
contract work in a year comply with the executive order’s equal
employment opportunity policy.”33 According to Tico Almeida,
president of Freedom to Work, employers contracting with the
federal government account for 22% of jobs in the United
States.34 An amendment to EO 11246 would provide the
Department of Labor with greater power to prohibit employers
from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.35
Amending the executive order would also result in the
extension of certain benefits to LGBT employees because “[EO
11246] . . . requires covered contractors to take affirmative
action to ensure that equal opportunity is provided in all
aspects of their employment.”36
The CAP memo notes that an amendment to EO 11246
or a new executive order could require those contracting with
the federal government to install recruitment and retention
programs for LGBT employees and to create workplace
education initiatives to reduce workplace discrimination and
harassment.37 “These are the kinds of ‘soft’ affirmative action
steps currently required with respect to national origin and
religion.”38 On the other hand, numerical placement goals
currently only apply to race, ethnicity, and gender.39 The memo
suggests that introducing such goals for sexual orientation and
gender identity “may be logistically, legally and politically
problematic.”40 President Obama has since decided not to
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure
that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment,
without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Such action shall
include, but not be limited to the following: employment, upgrading, demotion, or
transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or
other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship.”)
32 LGBT Equality in Government Contracting, supra note 30.
33 Chris Geidner, Recognition, and Limitations, METROWEEKLY (Jan. 24,
2012, 1:41 AM), http://www.metroweekly.com/news/?ak=6989.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 The Executive Order 11246, Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/
compliance/laws/comp-eeo.htm.
37 LGBT Equality in Government Contracting, supra note 30.
38 Id. at 9.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 9-10. Due to a complete lack of legal precedent on the point of
treatment of LGBT affirmative action programs under the Equal Protection Clause,
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amend EO 11246,41 stating a preference for Congress to pass a
version of ENDA.42 Although the Senate passed a version of
ENDA on November 7, 2013,43 the Republican majority in the
House of Representatives makes any passage of the proposed
legislation unlikely.44
Although development in legislation with regard to
LGBT employment protections remains stagnant, there has
been discussion of the role that sexual orientation may play in
the admissions practices among institutions of higher learning.
A few colleges, for example, have begun to consider applicants’
sexual orientation in their admissions processes. Middlebury
College, which generally prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation and gender identity, maintains an
affirmative action plan that is “commit[ed] to good faith and
lawful efforts to correct any under-representation or underutilization that has been identified by the College as warranting
such action.”45 In October 2006, Inside Higher Ed reported that
the assistant director of admissions at Middlebury announced
that the school would begin to allot an “attribute” to those
applicants that identified themselves as gay in their admissions
application.46 This admissions characteristic was the same
afforded to members of ethnic minority groups, athletes, and
children of alumni.47 But following the release of the story, that
same assistant director of admissions denied that Middlebury
had any such admissions policy.48 Nevertheless, the idea left
extending the language of EO 11246 to sexual orientation would enter previously
unexplored legal territory. See infra Part V.
41 Chris Geidner, White House Says No Federal Contractor Nondiscrimination
Executive Order “At This Time”, METROWEEKLY (Apr. 11, 2012, 6:05 PM),
http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/04/white-house-no-federal-contractornondiscriminatio.html.
42 Chris Geidner, News Analysis: Obama Executive Order Decision Raises
Question Whether He’s Broken 2008 Pledge, METROWEEKLY (Apr. 13, 2012, 4:20 PM),
http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/04/news-analysis-obama-executive-orderdecision-raise.html.
43 HRC Staff, “ENDA Passes Senate 64-32,” HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Nov.
7, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/enda-passes-senate-64-32.
44 Chris Geidner, Workplace Protections for LGBT Workers Remains Stalled,
BUZZFEED (Dec. 18, 2012, 5:18 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/workplaceprotections-for-lgbt-workers-remain-stal.
45 About
Middlebury, College Handbook, Affirmative Action Policy,
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE, http://www.middlebury.edu/about/handbook/general/aff_action
(last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
46 Scott Jaschik, Affirmative Action for Gay Students, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Oct. 9, 2006, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/10/09/gay.
47 Id.
48 See Shawn R. Passalacqua, Middlebury Admissions Not Affected by Sexual
Preference,
HARVARD
CRIMSON
(Oct.
20,
2006),
http://www.thecrimson.com/
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some administrators, counselors, and students thinking that
there was “a case to be made” for such a program.49 Others
criticized the purposes of such a program and the potential
issues with its implementation.50
In January 2011, the board of The Common Application,
a nonprofit organization that provides a common application
for nearly 500 colleges and universities,51 announced that it
rejected a proposal to add questions about applicants’ sexual
orientation and gender identity.52 Although reserving the
possibility of reviewing the decision “later this decade” in light
of “evolving cultural norms,” the Common Application board
noted that, at present, admissions officers and guidance
counselors were concerned that the “anxiety and uncertainty”
of students unsure how to respond might outweigh any benefits
of asking the questions.53 Shane L. Windmeyer, executive
director and founder of Campus Pride, a nonprofit organization
that develops “support programs and services to create safer,
more inclusive LGBT-friendly colleges and universities,”54
responded negatively to the Common Application’s decision.55
Windmeyer stated that the board was “acting like a parent of the
1950s” and that asking students about their sexual orientation
sends a message that they can “be who they are as they apply to
college, and for them to see that they can find a safe place.”56

article/2006/10/20/middlebury-admissions-not-affected-by-sexual/; Kimberly Chow, Colleges
Discuss Admit Preference for Gays, YALE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 30, 2006),
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2006/oct/30/colleges-discuss-admit-preferences-for-gays/.
49 See Jaschik, supra note 46 (quoting Greg McCandless, associate director of
admission at Harvey Mudd College); Chow, supra note 48.
50 One such criticism is that the potential for fraud is great, as it would
be difficult for the administration to differentiate between a student who is
genuinely gay and one who says so for a “leg up” on the admissions process.
Nathan Everly, Affirmative Action for Homosexual Students Misguided, STUDENT
LIFE, (Nov. 1, 2006, 12:00 PM), http://www.studlife.com/archives/Forum/2006/11/01/
Affirmativeactionforhomosexualstudentsmisguided/.
51 Mission, COMMON APPLICATION, https://www.commonapp.org/CommonApp/
Mission.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2012).
52 Jacques Steinberg, Common Application Won’t Add Questions on Sexual
Orientation, N.Y. TIMES: THE CHOICE BLOG (Jan. 26, 2011, 2:32 PM),
http://thechoice.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/common-ap-2/.
53 Scott Jaschik, The Same Boxes to Check, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 26,
2011),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/01/26/common_application_rejects_
new_questions_on_sexual_orientation_and_gender_identity.
54 Mission, Vision & Values, CAMPUS PRIDE, http://www.campuspride.org/
about/mission/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
55 Jaschik, supra note 53.
56 Id. (quoting Shane L. Windmeyer).
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Later that year, Elmhurst College57 announced that it
would include a question on its admissions application asking
applicants about their sexual orientation and gender identity.58
The school’s administration said that it wanted to use the
application questions to connect students to campus resources
and to identify students eligible for “Enrichment Scholarships,”
which are awarded to “talented students whose presence would
add to the diversity and richness of campus life.”59 Elmhurst
College emphasized its interest in diversity for educational
purposes, and to build “a campus community that resembles our
diverse society and multicultural world” engages students with a
“wide spectrum of individuals.”60 It added that “[e]ncouraging
talented, self-identified gay and transgender students” to attend
Elmhurst would improve the quality of every student’s
education.61 It is unclear how or even if the application question
factors into the admissions process, but at a minimum the
question and the scholarship resemble a “soft” recruitment and
retention program described in the CAP memo, albeit one in an
educational context.
Affirmative action programs based on sexual orientation
are limited in scope and appear to be available only in certain
jurisdictions that have enacted the programs as part of a
broader regulatory scheme.62 The potential for expansion of these
programs, however, is made more plausible by the recent victories
achieved for gay rights.63 Opponents of affirmative action
therefore should consider the means available to combat
expansion of these programs. Race-based affirmative action
programs remain politically unpopular64 and have even been
57 About Elmhurst College, ELMHURST COLLEGE, http://public.elmhurst.edu/
about/101310474.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
58 Eric Hoover, Elmhurst College Will Ask Applicants About Sexual Orientation,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED., HEAD COUNT BLOG (Aug. 23, 2011, 10:40 PM),
http://chronicle.com/blogs/headcount/elmhurst-college-will-ask-applicants-about-sexualorientation/28553.
59 S. Alan Ray, Despite Controversy, We’re Glad We Asked, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
ED. (Oct. 9, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Despite-the-Controversy-Were/129316/.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See Mallory & Sears, supra note 18 (discussing affirmative action
programs for government contractors).
63 See Geidner, The Seven States (Or More) That Could See Marriage
Equality in 2013, supra note 28; Geidner, With Unprecedented Gay Victories, U.S.
Looks Wedded to Change, supra note 28 (detailing those recent victories).
64 Racially-based affirmative action to redress past discrimination remains
unpopular and there is no demographic shift in favor of it, with a 2012 survey finding that 47%
of eighteen to twenty-five year olds oppose, and 38% are in favor. See ROBERT P. JONES,
DANIEL COX, & JUHEM NAVARRO-RIVERA, DIVERSE, DISILLUSIONED, AND DIVIDED: MILLENNIAL
VALUES AND VOTER ENGAGEMENT IN THE 2012 ELECTION 25 (2012), available at
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banned in several jurisdictions.65 However, constitutional scrutiny
analysis under the equal protection clause has provided
opponents of affirmative action with an additional method of
limiting these programs.66 A heightened or strict scrutiny
standard for classifications based on sexual orientation would
produce similar results and might prevent these affirmative
action programs from ever taking root.67 To demonstrate how
higher scrutiny of LGBT-based classifications provides a benefit
to opponents of affirmative action, it is helpful to begin with a
discussion of scrutiny analysis and its use in relation to
classifications based on sexual orientation.
II.

EQUAL PROTECTION AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION

A.

Three (and a Half?) Tiers: Strict Scrutiny, Heightened
Scrutiny, and Rational Basis

In footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products,68
the Court explained when more searching judicial scrutiny of
legislation appearing to infringe on constitutional rights
becomes appropriate: “[P]rejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”69 The Court
has followed this principle in its analysis of cases under the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring
that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”70

http://repository.berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/121004DiverseDisillusionedDividedMillenni
alValuesVoterEngagement2012Election.pdf.
65 Eight states currently ban affirmative action programs: Michigan,
California, Florida, Washington, Arizona, Oklahoma, Nebraska, and New Hampshire.
See Richard Wolf, Justices Voice Support for State Affirmative Action Ban, USA TODAY
(Oct. 15, 2013 3:59 PM), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/
10/15/supreme-court-affirmative-action-race-michigan/2969443/.
66 See infra Part III.
67 See infra Part IV.
68 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
69 Id. at 152-53 n.4.
70 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The language of the equal protection clause
applies to the federal government by way of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
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Laws relying upon classifications based on race and
national origin, known as “suspect” classifications, are subject to
strict scrutiny. Such laws “will be sustained only if they are
suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”71 The Court
burdens such a law with a strict scrutiny analysis because race and
national origin “are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations
are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy . . . .”72
Laws employing classifications based on gender, known
as “quasi-suspect” classifications, are subject to heightened
scrutiny and will fail “unless [the need to employ a gender
classification is] substantially related to a sufficiently important
governmental interest.”73 The Court is suspicious of laws that
disparately burden members of a particular gender because
such laws “very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative
capabilities of men and women.”74 Additionally, the Court’s
most recent gender-based equal protection challenge, United
States v. Virginia,75 spotlighted language from Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan,76 which required the State to
demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its
use of a classification based on gender.77
The lowest tier of scrutiny analysis, the rational basis
test, is used when social or economic legislation is at issue and
extends “the States wide latitude” in matters traditionally
within the realm of state regulation.78 The “legislation is presumed
to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”79 In such
cases, the Court defers to the findings of the legislature, even if the
law “exact[s] a needless, wasteful requirement.”80
On a number of occasions, however, the Court has
struck down laws challenged under the equal protection clause
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
Id.
73 Id. at 440-41.
74 Id. at 440.
75 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
76 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
77 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724. In his dissent from
United States v. Virginia, Justice Scalia noted that the Court did not explain whether a
“justification” is “exceedingly persuasive” if it is substantially related to important
government interests, and that the Court instead seems to be employing the former
language in place of the latter, thus increasing the level of scrutiny applied to gender.
Id. at 571-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
79 Id.
80 Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
71

72
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despite the lack of a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. In
these instances, the Court employs what scholars have called a
“rational basis with bite” approach.81 “As a matter of historical
fact, proving that a law is based on unconstitutional animus is
virtually the only way for a plaintiff to defeat deferential
rational basis review.”82 In U.S. Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno, the Court examined Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act,
which denied food stamps to individuals living in households
containing one or more unrelated members.83 The Court
examined the legislative record and found that the little
supporting legislative history indicated that Section 3(e) was
intended to prevent “hippies” and “hippie communes” from
benefitting from the food stamp program.84 In invalidating the
provision, the Court stated that “if the constitutional
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest.”85
Moreover, in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the
Court struck down a zoning ordinance that required a special
permit for group homes for the mentally retarded in a
particular zoning district.86 Though the Court determined that
mental retardation did not constitute a “quasi-suspect”
classification and that laws impacting such a group should be
examined under the rational basis test, it nonetheless struck
down the ordinance by rejecting each of the city’s justifications
for its zoning regime.87 The city made two arguments in
support of its ordinance,88 both of which the Court found to
“rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded.”89 Because “[t]he State may not rely on a
classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so
81 See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987).
82 Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
887, 898 (2012).
83 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973).
84 Id. at 534.
85 Id. (emphasis omitted).
86 See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
87 See id. at 446-49.
88 First, it argued that the proposed location of the group home was across
the street from a junior high school, and the city feared that students might harass the
residents. The city’s second justification was that the location was on “a five hundred
year flood plain,” and thus placed residents in danger. Id. at 449 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
89 Id. at 450.
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attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational,”
the ordinance was held to be invalid.90
B.

The Supreme Court on Sexual Orientation

The Supreme Court has addressed laws relating to
sexual orientation only a handful of times in the past 20
years.91 In Romer v. Evans, the Court was faced with a
challenge to Amendment 2 to the Colorado State Constitution,
which repealed recently enacted local ordinances prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and prevented
any future “legislative, executive or judicial action at any level
of state or local government designed to protect the named
class.”92 The Amendment was the product of a popular
referendum, one fueled in part by a rise in nondiscrimination
ordinances enacted in the cities of Aspen, Boulder, and
Denver.93 Among other things, these local ordinances banned
public and private discrimination on the basis of sexuality in
“housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and
health and welfare services.”94
Colorado defended the Amendment by arguing that it
did not take rights away, but simply put homosexuals back on
equal footing with heterosexuals. The State asserted that all
the Amendment did was take away homosexuals’ “special
rights.”95 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, refused to
accept this argument, noting that the evident purpose of
Amendment 2 was to withdraw a set of rights, which were in
no way “special,”96 from a single, specific classification of
people:97 “These are protections taken for granted by most
people either because they already have them or do not need
them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
ordinary civic life in a free society.”98
Rather than establishing sexual orientation as a suspect
or quasi-suspect classification, however, the Court struck down
Id. at 446-47 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
92 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 626.
96 Id. at 631.
97 Id. at 627.
98 Id. at 631.
90

91
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Amendment 2 under the rational basis test.99 The Court found
that the law did not satisfy even the lowest level of judicial
inquiry under the equal protection clause, which requires that
a law’s classification scheme “bear[ ] a rational relation to some
legitimate end.”100 The Court was startled by the “sheer
breadth” of Amendment 2, finding it “so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”101 The
“default mechanism of rational basis review”102 permitted the
Court to dispose of a constitutionally unacceptable law, as in
Cleburne and Moreno, without deciding whether to enshrine a
new class of individuals as suspect or quasi-suspect for equal
protection purposes.
In 2003, the Court revisited the constitutionality of antisodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas.103 Seventeen years earlier,
the Court had upheld anti-sodomy laws in Bowers v.
Hardwick.104 Writing for the Court once again, Justice Kennedy
invalidated a Texas statute criminalizing consensual sex
between adult males, thus overruling the Bowers holding.105 The
Court held that the right to liberty under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles two adults consenting to
sex to a right to privacy beyond government intervention.106 The
Court also addressed Texas’s alternative argument that the
statute was distinguishable from the law in Bowers and therefore
could not be shielded by precedent. Unlike the law at issue in
Bowers, the anti-sodomy statute in Lawrence criminalized
conduct only between same-sex individuals, which made an
equal protection challenge an appropriate avenue for relief.107
Though a “tenable” assertion, the Court dismissed Texas’s
equal protection argument because accepting it would allow
states to prohibit the sodomy so long as it proscribed the
behavior among same-sex and different-sex partners.108 “If
protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
101 Id. at 632.
102 Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened
Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1552 (2003).
103 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
104 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
105 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 at 578-79.
106 Id. at 578.
107 Id. at 574.
108 Id.
99

100
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remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma
might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal
protection reasons.”109 In its two decisions on the constitutionality
of anti-sodomy laws, the Court resolved the challenges under a due
process, rather than equal protection analysis.110
Just as the Court in Romer made no determination of
whether heightened scrutiny should apply to classifications
based on sexual orientation, the Lawrence due process-based
decision simply stated that “[t]he Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.”111 Justice O’Connor
concurred in the Court’s judgment but disagreed that the
statute was invalid under the due process clause. Instead,
Justice O’Connor addressed the challenge as one arising under
the equal protection clause.112 In an attempt to explain the
Court’s prior invalidation of laws under a rational basis
standard, Justice O’Connor wrote that
[S]ome objectives, such as a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group, are not legitimate state interests. When a law
exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have
applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.113

Because the Texas statute treated similarly situated parties
differently (same-sex versus opposite-sex couples), and the
State’s purported interest in promoting morality was not
legitimate, Justice O’Connor found the statute to be
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.114
Some scholars and commenters see the Court’s
reasoning in Romer and Lawrence as a step in the direction of
heightened scrutiny.115 “Traditionally, the requirement that a
statute or state action be rational is very weak and highly
deferential; almost any justification is enough to establish

Id. at 575.
Id.
111 Id. at 578.
112 Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
113 Id. at 580 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
114 Id. at 579-81.
115 See, e.g., Kevin H. Lewis, Equal Protection After Romer v. Evans:
Implications For the Defense of Marriage Act and Other Laws, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 175,
190 (“Some scholars have contended that although the Romer decision itself does not
identify sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect class, it is the first step on the road
towards that end.”).
109
110
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rationality.”116 The Court’s more searching examination of
Amendment 2 in Romer, reminded some commenters of Reed v.
Reed,117 where the Court invalidated an Idaho law establishing
that when estates were left intestate, a man was chosen above
a woman as the estate’s executor.118 In Reed, Idaho defended its
law as one that merely created a standard set of rules, thus
eliminating hearings on the merits and minimizing intrafamily controversy. But the Court stated that drawing the line
at gender “[made] the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”119 “This case can . . . be viewed as a struggle to avoid
having to refine the equal protection doctrine (by applying
intermediate scrutiny) or having to define clearly the existing
doctrine (by applying strict scrutiny outside the context of race).”120
In both Reed and Romer, the Court applied rational basis, rejected
the States’ purported interests and saw at bottom two laws
motivated by arbitrary and unacceptable classifications.121
Shortly following Reed, a plurality of the Court led by
Justice Brennan applied strict scrutiny to a gender-based
classification in Frontiero v. Richardson.122 Failing to achieve a
majority in that case, however, the Court later settled on a
heightened scrutiny standard for gender classifications in Craig v.
Boren. In Boren, the Court struck down an Oklahoma law that
set the legal age for the purchase of low-alcohol beer at 18 for
women and 21 for men.123 Though “Reed indicated that heightened
scrutiny for sex was imminent,” leading scholars to speculate that

116 Edward Stein, Introducing Lawrence v. Texas: Some Background and a
Glimpse of the Future, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 269 (2004) (“[S]ome scholars
view the Romer Court as in fact applying a somewhat heightened standard of review,
one roughly equivalent to intermediate scrutiny or one in between mere rational review
and intermediate scrutiny (‘rational review with bite’).”).
117 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
118 Id.; Stein, supra note 116, at 269 (“Given how weak the requirement of
mere rational is, many have thought that the Court in Romer must have been applying
more than the weak rationality requirement. Supporters of this reading of Romer
might point to an early sex discrimination case, Reed v. Reed.”); Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Principled Silence: Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), 106 YALE L.J. 247,
250 (1996) (“Such reticence calls to mind the Court’s opinion in Reed v. Reed.”).
119 Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
120 John Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 508, 519-20 (1993).
121 Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the
Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to
Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2781-82 (2005).
122 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion).
123 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation was “just around the
corner,”124 the Supreme Court has yet to make that leap.
C.

Defense of Marriage Act and Proposition 8 Cases

Still lacking a defined or fixed test from the Supreme
Court for sexuality-based classifications, lower federal and
state courts have struggled to apply the reasoning of Romer
and Lawrence.125 “Ignoring the implications of these decisions,
federal courts have continued to apply traditional rational
basis review without examining whether the classification at
issue may be based on animus or notions of majoritarian
morality without a true legitimate governmental interest.”126
However, a recent string of cases striking down Section 3 of
DOMA127 as unconstitutional have lent new hope to the
application of a “more searching rational basis” analysis that is
nearer in spirit to the test the Court used in Romer and
Lawrence.128 Although the Court struck down Section 3 of DOMA
last year in United States v. Windsor,129 it is helpful to examine
the reasoning that the lower federal courts used to strike down
the provision. Windsor continues the tradition of Romer and
Lawrence of striking down a law based on a relatively narrow
animus analysis under rational basis, so the scope of review has
not shifted as dramatically as some expected.130
In Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services,131 the First Circuit invalidated Section 3 of
DOMA using a form of rational basis review,132 noting that
“Supreme Court equal protection decisions have both
intensified scrutiny of purported justifications where minorities
are subject to discrepant treatment and have limited the

Stein, supra note 116, at 270.
See Hunter, supra note 102; Smith, Note, supra note 121.
126 Smith, supra note 121, at 2785.
127 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
128 Smith, supra note 121, at 2808.
129 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
130 See infra Part II.D.
131 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
132 The court also intensified its analysis due to the federalism issues inherent
in DOMA, that is, Congress legislating on marriage, which has long been an issue
within the sphere of state law. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Serv., 682 F.3d at 11-16.
124

125
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permissible justifications.”133 While the Supreme Court did not
adopt a new category of suspect classification in Romer, they
“rested on the case-specific nature of the discrepant treatment,
the burden imposed, and the infirmities of the justifications
offered.”134 Finding that the disparate treatment and burden
imposed by the law were great,135 the court turned to the
justifications offered by the Bipartisan Legal Assistance Group
(BLAG), which stepped in to defend DOMA when the Obama
administration ceased doing so in February 2011.136
The court rejected BLAG’s first argument that DOMA
preserves scarce government resources “by limiting tax savings
and avoiding social security and other payments to spouses,”137
noting that keeping resources away from historically
disadvantaged
groups
undermines
the
constitutional
legitimacy of a law rather than providing support for it.138
BLAG’s second justification in defending DOMA was to
promote stable, heterosexual marriages for child-rearing
purposes.139 The First Circuit noted that it did not even need to
address the debate over the quality of child-rearing by samesex couples, because DOMA was not connected to such a goal.
No part of DOMA prohibits a same-sex couple from adopting a
child, nor does the law increase benefits to child-rearing by
opposite-sex couples.140 “This is not merely a matter of poor fit
of remedy to perceived problem, but a lack of any demonstrated
connection between DOMA’s treatment of same-sex couples
and its asserted goal of strengthening the bonds and benefits to
society of heterosexual marriage.”141
Id. at 10.
Id.
135 Id. at 11.
136 See supra Introduction; see also Obama: DOMA Unconstitutional, DOJ
Should Stop Defending In Court, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2011, 12:21 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/23/obama-doma-unconstitutional_n_827134.html;
Chris Geidner, House Republicans Vote to Defend DOMA in Court on Party Line 3-2
Vote, METROWEEKLY (Mar. 9, 2011, 6:14 PM), http://metroweekly.com/poliglot/
2011/03/house-republicans-vote-to-defe.html.
137 Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 14. The court disagreed with the proposition
that DOMA preserves government resources and cited a report of the Congressional
Budget Office suggesting the opposite. Id. at 14 n.9.
138 Id. at 14. The court alluded to the principles of discrete and insular
minorities and “representation reinforcement”: [W]hen a minority group is deprived of the
ability to represent itself in the political process, it is the court’s role to step in. Id.
Paradoxically, despite the court’s reasoning, such risks would typically call for a strict
scrutiny analysis under the principles of footnote four, rather than a “rational basis with
bite” approach. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
139 Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 14.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
133
134
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The third justification that the court imputed from the
legislative record in support of DOMA was moral disapproval of
homosexuality.142 The court noted that although “moral
disapproval had been an adequate basis for legislation . . . for
generations,” the Supreme Court had spoken in Romer and in
Lawrence and rejected moral disapproval of homosexuals as a
legitimate governmental purpose.143
The fourth and final justification BLAG cited was that
DOMA allowed Congress to put a temporary “freeze” on the
situation of legalization of gay marriage in one state bleeding
into others, giving itself time to reflect on the issue.144 But
given that Congress had neither framed the statute as such nor
written an expiration date into the law, the First Circuit
rejected this argument.145 The court did not find a single
legitimate justification in support of DOMA and believed that
“disparate impact on minority interests and federalism
concerns both require somewhat more in this case than almost
automatic deference to Congress’ will.”146 The court found
Section 3 of DOMA to be constitutionally invalid despite gays
and lesbians not being a suspect or quasi-suspect group.147
Similarly, in Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel
Management, the Northern District of California found Section
3 of DOMA to be unconstitutional under a rational basis test.148
Karen Golinski, a staff attorney for the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sought to enroll her wife in her family coverage health
insurance plan, but the administrative office of the United
States Courts, citing Section 3 of DOMA, refused her
demand.149 The court recited the principle that “[a] statutory
142 Id. (“Civil laws that permit only heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a
collective moral judgment about human sexuality. This judgment entails both moral
disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better
comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.”(citation omitted)).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See id. at 11-15.
148 Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp.2d 968, 995 (N.D. Cal.
2012). The court also conducted its own analysis on whether heightened scrutiny
should apply because the Supreme Court had left the door open as to whether sexual
orientation was a suspect classification. Id. at 983-85. Additionally, Romer and
Lawrence made the underpinnings of the Ninth Circuit case High Tech Gays v. Def.
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990), which determined that
classifications based on sexual orientation should receive only traditional rational basis
review, no longer applicable. Id. The court determined that heightened scrutiny should
apply to such classifications, but also found, alternatively, that Section 3 of DOMA did
not pass rational basis review. Id. at 995.
149 Id. at 974-75.
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classification fails rational-basis review only when it ‘rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s
objective.’”150 The court addressed four justifications given for
DOMA: the “promot[ion] [of] traditional notions of morality,”
the “preserv[ation] [of] the government fisc,” the promotion of
“responsible procreation and child-rearing,” and a need to
“nurtur[e] the institution of traditional, opposite-sex
marriage.”151 The court found the first two stated interests in
support of DOMA to not be legitimate justifications for denying
same-sex marriage, and it found the latter two interests not
rationally related to that denial.152
Yet again, in Pederson v. Office of Personnel
Management, the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut found that Section 3 of DOMA violated the equal
protection clause under the rational basis test.153 The court
rejected each of six justifications in support of DOMA.154 The
interests cited were: “defending and nurturing the institution
of traditional heterosexual marriage,” “recognizing an
institution to ensure that children have parents of both sexes,”
“defending traditional notions of morality,” “preserving scarce
governmental resources and protecting the public fisc,”
“protecting state sovereignty and democratic self-governance,”
and finally, “maintaining consistency and uniformity with
regard to eligibility for federal benefits and employing caution
in the face of a proposed redefinition of the centuries-old
definition of marriage.”155 It found that each of these reasons
was either a non-justifiable interest for denying same-sex
marriage or the means employed were not rationally related to
the furtherance of that interest.156
In Perry v. Brown157 (now known as Hollingsworth v.
158
Perry ), the Ninth Circuit questioned the constitutionality of
Id. at 996 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993)).
Id. at 996-99.
152 Id. The court also conducted a heightened scrutiny analysis and
determined that the law was invalid under all of its stated justifications. Id. at 990-95.
153 Just as in the Golinski decision, the district court held that classifications
based on sexual orientation should be analyzed under heightened scrutiny. Pederson v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp.2d 294, 333-34 (D. Conn. 2012). However, the court
did not apply heightened scrutiny in that case because “it is clear that DOMA fails to pass
constitutional muster under even the most deferential level of judicial scrutiny.” Id.
154 Id. at 335-46.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
158 Hollingsworth v. Perry (formerly known as Perry v. Brown and Perry v.
Schwarzenegger), LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/perry-vschwarzenegger (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
150

151
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Proposition 8, a public referendum amending the California
State Constitution to define marriage as the union between one
man and one woman.159 Proposition 8 overturned a decision of
the Supreme Court of California finding same-sex marriage to
be a right under the State Constitution.160 The Ninth Circuit
examined Proposition 8 under Romer, interpreting that case as
standing for the proposition that “the Equal Protection Clause
protects minority groups from being targeted for the deprivation
of an existing right without a legitimate reason.”161 The court
found that the amendment did not further and was not
rationally related to any of the interests offered in support of the
law. These interests included “childrearing and responsible
procreation,” “proceeding with caution when considering
changes to the definition of marriage,” protecting religious
liberty, and “preventing children from being taught about samesex marriage in schools.”162 The court also found that “restor[ing]
the traditional definition of marriage as referring to a union
between a man and a woman” was not a legitimate state interest
because “tradition alone is not a justification for taking away a
right that had already been granted, even though that grant was
in derogation of tradition.”163 Just as Romer held that
Amendment 2 was not justified simply because the rights it took
away were not traditionally enjoyed under the common law,
Proposition 8’s only purpose was to repeal the right of marriage
and could not be justified on any constitutional grounds.164
D.

Windsor v. United States165

Two lawsuits filed in the Second Circuit, which at the
time had no precedent establishing the standard of review for
suspect classifications based on sexuality, spurred the Obama
administration to change positions on the standard of review it
thought should apply to such classifications.166 In response to
these lawsuits, the Department of Justice took an affirmative,
Perry, 671 F.3d 1052.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
161 Perry, 671 F.3d at 1076.
162 Id. at 1086.
163 Id. at 1092.
164 Id. After the State of California declined to defend Proposition 8, the
official proponents of the ballot initiative intervened and appealed the decision to the
Supreme Court. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659-61 (2013). Prior to
reaching the merits, the Court held that the private appellants did not have standing
to appeal the decision. Id. at 2668.
165 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012).
166 Letter from the Attorney General, supra note 2.
159
160
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novel stance on the level of scrutiny that should apply to
DOMA.167 The New York Times speculated that had the
administration maintained the status quo and argued in
support of the rational basis standard, it “would most likely
have had to conclude that [gays and lesbians] have not been
historically stigmatized and can change their orientation” in
order to justify why heightened scrutiny was inappropriate.168
Edith Windsor sued the United States government after
she was denied the spousal deduction for federal estate taxes
because Section 3 of DOMA prohibited the IRS from
recognizing Windsor’s partner as her wife.169 The denial
resulted in a payment of $363,053 more than she would
otherwise have paid in an opposite-sex marriage.170 Expressing
some hesitation that DOMA could fail under a rational basis
test,171 the court was relieved of that outcome in finding that
“[f]ortunately, no permutation of rational basis review is
needed if heightened scrutiny is available, as it is in this
case.”172 On October 18, 2012, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals became the second federal appeals court to strike down
Section 3 of DOMA and the first federal appeals court to
determine that gays and lesbians constitute a “quasi-suspect”
class. As a result, laws employing such a classification should
receive heightened scrutiny in that circuit.173
The court undertook the multi-factor test used by the
Supreme Court in determining whether a new classification
qualifies as a quasi-suspect class:
A) whether the class has been historically subjected to
discrimination; B) whether the class has a defining characteristic
that frequently bears [a] relation to ability to perform or contribute
to society; C) whether the class exhibits obvious immutable, or

Id.
Savage & Stolberg, supra note 1.
169 Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 at 175.
170 Id. at 176.
171 Id. at 180 (“So a party urging the absence of any rational basis takes up a
heavy load. That would seem to be true in this case—the law was passed by
overwhelming bipartisan majorities in both houses of Congress; it has varying impact
on more than a thousand federal laws; and the definition of marriage it affirms has
been long-supported and encouraged.”).
172 Id. at 181.
173 Id. at 185; Chris Geidner, Federal Appeals Court: Marriage Recognition
Ban Unconstitutional, BUZZFEED (Oct. 18, 2012, 12:46 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
chrisgeidner/federal-appeals-court-doma-is-unconstitutional.
167
168
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distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group;
and D) whether the class is a minority or politically powerless.174

The court determined that all four factors justified the
application of heightened scrutiny to classifications based on
sexual orientation.175 Interestingly, finding a parallel between
the present case and the status of women’s political power at
the time of Frontiero v. Richardson, the court stated that while
the position of gays and lesbians “‘has improved markedly in
recent decades,’ . . . they still ‘face pervasive, although at times
more subtle, discrimination . . . in the political arena.’”176
It is difficult to say whether homosexuals are “under-represented” in
positions of power and authority without knowing their number
relative to the heterosexual population. But it is safe to say that the
seemingly small number of acknowledged homosexuals so situated is
attributable either to a hostility that excludes them or to a hostility
that keeps their sexual preference private—which, for our purposes,
amounts to much the same thing.177

Because it found that gays and lesbians meet the four criteria
of the Supreme Court’s suspect classification analysis and that
they “are not in a position to adequately protect themselves from
the discriminatory wishes of the majoritarian public,” the
Second Circuit agreed with the position of the Obama
administration and found that sexual orientation-based
classifications should be subject to heightened scrutiny.178
Despite meeting all four factors, the court settled on heightened
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, explaining that while gays
and lesbians have suffered from “significant and long-standing
discrimination in public and private spheres, this mistreatment
‘is not sufficient to require [ ] most exacting scrutiny.’”179
The Second Circuit proceeded to strike down Section 3
of DOMA under heightened scrutiny, requiring that “a
classification must be ‘substantially related to an important
government interest.’”180 The court understood “substantially
related” to mean that “the explanation must be ‘exceedingly
persuasive,’ . . . ‘genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc
174 Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted) (alteration in original).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 184 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1973)).
177 Id. at 184-85.
178 Id. at 185.
179 Id. (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977)) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
180 Id. (quoting Clark v Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).
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in response to litigation.’”181 The court held that BLAG’s four
justifications (“maintaining a ‘uniform definition’ of marriage,”
“protecting the fisc,” “preserving a traditional understanding of
marriage,” and “encouraging responsible procreation”) were not
substantially related to the quasi-suspect class impacted by
DOMA.182 The Second Circuit employed heightened scrutiny to
strike down a law that the First Circuit and a number of lower
courts disposed of under the less demanding so-called “rational
basis with bite” test of Romer and Lawrence.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Second Circuit but once again did so under narrower
grounds.183 Eschewing the definitive language of the Second
Circuit, the Court struck down Section 3 of DOMA under what
appeared to be a rational basis review.184 The Court cited
Moreno and Romer’s “improper animus or purpose” language
and concluded that “[t]he avowed purpose and practical effect
of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a
separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into samesex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of
the States.”185 DOMA’s legislative history also showed that the
law was passed to express “both moral disapproval of
homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality
better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian)
morality.”186 The majority opinion, however, did not address the
Second Circuit’s decision to employ heightened scrutiny in its
analysis as a result of historical animus shown to lesbian and
gay individuals.187 The Court’s reasoning was much closer to
that of the First Circuit in Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, which struck down Section 3 of
DOMA under “heightened” rational basis review due in part to
the unique Tenth Amendment concerns of DOMA.188 In all,
while the Court’s reasoning resulted in striking down Section 3
of DOMA, it has not added very much to the jurisprudence
regarding LGBT classifications. Windsor is not the sea-change
181 Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)) (internal
citation omitted).
182 Id. at 185-88.
183 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
184 In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy does not use the phrase “rational
basis review,” although its typical phrasing of “legitimate purpose” is used to describe
DOMA’s failings. Id. at 2696.
185 Id. at 2693.
186 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, 16 (1996)).
187 See generally id.
188 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 682 F.3d 1,
11-14 (1st Cir. 2012).
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Reed-like decision commentators have been awaiting since
Romer. The majority neither dismissed nor endorsed the
Second Circuit’s use of heightened scrutiny and left the issue to
further develop in lower federal courts.
III.

SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS: RACE AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION

To better understand the likely treatment of sexual
orientation-based affirmative action programs under the equal
protection clause, it is important to understand cases
discussing race-based affirmative action, which is, by far, the
most developed area of affirmative action jurisprudence. The
past 20 or 30 years of Supreme Court jurisprudence on
affirmative action has been referred to as cases about “white
rights,”189 as these cases have been brought by white
individuals claiming that affirmative action programs have
discriminated against them on the basis of race.190 These
affirmative action cases have extended the application of strict
scrutiny from laws discriminating on the basis of race to those
employing racial classifications in affirmative action

189 See John O. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi’s “Messy” Real World of Race:
An Essay for “Naked People Longing to Swim Free,” 15 LAW & INEQ. 25, 48 (1997)
(“[The Reagan] administration legitimized the organization of whites against blacks
and made claims of discrimination fungible enough that white rights and claims of
discrimination were allowed to actually displace black rights and claims of
discrimination.”); Conference, Race, Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the
American Dilemma, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 567, 579 (1996) (statement of Clarence Page)
(“Yes, the current Court has been moving in a pendulum swing away from black rights
and toward white rights.”); David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing Protected
Class: Reflections on Reverse Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Racial Balancing,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 657, 661 (2000) (“perhaps the Brown ‘revolution’ may have been the
blip (albeit a ten to thirty year blip), in a long judicial history of allowing white rights
to constrain, if not trump, the justiciable aspirations of non-whites.”).
190 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (white plaintiff rejected from
University of Texas at Austin sued due to consideration of race in admissions process);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (white plaintiff rejected from University of Michigan
sued due to consideration of race in admissions process); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (white plaintiff rejected from University of Michigan Law School sued due to
consideration of race in admissions process); Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (contractors sued after federal subcontract to build a highway was awarded to a
“disadvantaged” minority-owned business); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989) (general contractor sued after municipal contract originally awarded to it was rebid after failure to meet minority contracting requirements).
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programs.191 “[R]ace-conscious affirmative action has come to be
regarded as racism itself.”192
A.

Race-Based Affirmative Action Programs in the
Employment Context

The Court first held that strict scrutiny should apply to
race-based affirmative action programs in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.,193 where Justice O’Connor, writing for the
Court, invalidated Richmond’s “Minority Business Utilization
Plan.”194 Richmond’s program required city construction
contractors to subcontract at least 30% of a contract’s value to
one or more “Minority Business Enterprises” (MBEs).195 The plan
denied white “citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed
percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race,” and
the Court therefore determined that employing the “highly
suspect tool” of racial classification demands that such programs
satisfy strict scrutiny.196 The Court stated that “the purpose of
strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race,” and its
application was therefore necessary to determine whether the
legislature could justify the use of race in its program.197
The Court narrowed the permissible uses of race-based
classifications in the employment context. First, the Court
stated that increasing minority participation in a field of work
was “discrimination for its own sake” and thus invalid.198
Second, remedying past discrimination is only a compelling
interest when “triggered [by] ‘judicial, legislative, or
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations,’” and such a goal must be directed to “specific
instances of racial discrimination.”199 Remedying the effects of
discrimination in society at large is unjustifiable as “an
191 Fischer, 133 S. Ct. at 2415; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Grutter, 539 U.S. at
326; Adarand Constr., 515 U.S. at 227; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
192 John F. Adkins, Scott C. Moriearty, & Rheba Rutkowski, Equal
Opportunity and Affirmative Action Considerations, HFM MA-CLE 53,
MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, INC. (2008).
193 488 U.S. at 493; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 753 (4th ed. 2011).
194 Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
195 Id. at 477-78. “Minority Business Enterprises” were defined as a business
from anywhere in the country “at least fifty-one (51) percent of which is owned and
controlled . . . by . . . Black[ ], Spanish-speaking, Oriental[ ], Indian[ ], Eskimo[ ], or
Aleut[ ] citizens.” Id. at 477. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
196 Id. at 493. (plurality opinion).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 496 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
199 Id. at 497 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
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amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach
into the past.”200 Essentially, under Croson, the only justification
for a race-based affirmative action program is remedying specific
instances of prior discrimination by state actors affecting the
subject matter, whether educational or employment-related,
and jurisdiction of the program under review.201
The Court found that Richmond neither proved how
many minority business enterprises were active within its
jurisdiction nor the “level of [ ] participation” by minorities
within the construction market.202 Richmond had not shown that
“qualified minority contractors ha[d] been passed over for city
contracts or subcontracts, either as a group or in any individual
case.”203 In invalidating the law, the Court held that Richmond
had failed to justify the use of race by a sufficient “basis in
evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”204
Six years later, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña,
the Court reaffirmed the central holding of Croson, but stated
that Croson also applied to the federal government by way of
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.205 Once again
writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor stated that three
general propositions had become clear with respect to the use of
racial
classifications:
skepticism,206
congruence,207
and
consistency.208 Under the principle of consistency, the particular
race of the individual burdened or benefited by the classification
is irrelevant; classifications based on race will always receive
strict scrutiny.209 Dissenting in Adarand, Justice Stevens
illuminated the constitutional paradox the Court had created:
[T]he Court may find that its new “consistency” approach to racebased classifications is difficult to square with its insistence upon
rigidly separate categories for discrimination against different
classes of individuals. For example, as the law currently stands, the
Court will apply “intermediate scrutiny” to cases of invidious gender
discrimination and “strict scrutiny” to cases of invidious race

Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
Id. at 496-500 (plurality opinion and majority opinion).
202 Id. at 510 (plurality opinion).
203 Id. at 510.
204 Id. at 510 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277
(1986)) (internal quotations omitted).
205 Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
206 The principle of skepticism entails the application of “a most searching
examination” to any benefit based on race. Id. at 223 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273).
207 Congruence requires identical analysis under the Fifth Amendment and
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 223-24.
208 Id. at 224.
209 Id.
200
201
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discrimination, while applying the same standard for benign
classifications as for invidious ones. If this remains the law, then
today’s lecture about “consistency” will produce the anomalous result
that the Government can more easily enact affirmative-action
programs to remedy discrimination against women than it can enact
affirmative-action programs to remedy discrimination against AfricanAmericans—even though the primary purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause was to end discrimination against the former slaves.210

Croson and Adarand guaranteed that strict scrutiny would apply
to benign classifications on the basis of race, and the embrace of a
consistency principle established uneven footing for advocates
hoping to secure equal rights but also remedy past injustices.211
B.

Race-Based Affirmative Action Programs in Higher
Education

In Gratz v. Bollinger212 and Grutter v. Bollinger,213 the
Court dealt with the admissions processes at the University of
Michigan and the University of Michigan Law School
(Michigan Law) that considered the race of applicants in their
determinations. Because the Court deemed the use of racial
quotas unconstitutional in Regents of University of California v.
Bakke,214 institutions of higher learning began to consider the
race of a minority applicant as a “plus” in admissions.215 In
Gratz, the Court struck down an undergraduate admissions
process that automatically gave minority applicants 20 points
toward the 100 points needed to gain admission.216 Although the
volume of undergraduate applications made it administratively
impossible for the University of Michigan to conduct an
Id. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The consistency rationale meant that the level of scrutiny applied to
discriminatory racial classifications would also be applied to benign racial
classifications. This led some advocates to second-guess the benefits of strict scrutiny
for classifications based on gender. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Gender-Based Affirmative
Action and Reverse Gender Bias: Beyond Gratz, Parents Involved, and Ricci, 34 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 1, 36 (2011) (“However, after the Supreme Court adopted a rigid strict
scrutiny analysis for race-based affirmative action, which mandates evidence of
intentional discrimination by identifiable wrongdoers, Ginsburg, like other feminists,
understood that application of this stringent standard could be even more fatal to
gender preferences because of the subtle, elusive nature of gender bias. Thus, arguing
for the same treatment of race and gender became dangerous.”).
212 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
213 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
214 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
215 While striking down the University of California’s quota system, Justice
Powell endorsed the “Harvard Plan,” an individualized admissions process in which
each applicant was given a “plus” on factors such as race, personal talents, work
experience, overcoming disadvantage, etc. Id. at 317.
216 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.
210

211
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individualized inquiry into each applicant’s file, the Court
ruled that a practice of automatically boosting a student’s score
solely on the basis of his or her race was not a narrowly
tailored consideration of race.217
In Grutter, however, Michigan Law successfully repelled
the constitutional challenge to its race-based program because
it employed the individualized admissions process missing from
Gratz.218 Justices O’Connor and Breyer, who joined the Court in
striking down the undergraduate admissions program in Gratz,
joined the dissenters from that case to uphold the Michigan
Law program.219 Michigan Law conducted an “individualized,
holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a
diverse educational environment.”220 Because it was unlike the
undergraduate program in that it only used race as a “‘soft’
variable” and did not mechanically award bonuses on the basis
of race, the Court deemed Michigan Law’s admissions program
to be narrowly tailored.221
The Grutter decision was also significant for
acknowledging that Michigan Law’s purported goal of
achieving diversity was a compelling state interest, one strong
enough to justify its consideration of race in admissions.222
Michigan Law sought to enroll a “critical mass” of minority
students to accrue enhanced educational benefits to its student
body.223 Diversity, therefore, became a second compelling state
interest justifying the use of race in addition to efforts to
remedy a state actor’s past discrimination.224 The acceptance of
diversity as a compelling interest by a conservative Supreme
Court has been attacked as a Pyrrhic victory for liberals, as
“proponents of affirmative action have been forced to trade
arguments of equity for a rationale favoring diversity, and in so
doing, they may have silenced the most salient argument for
Id. at 275.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 337.
221 Id.
222 “More important . . . today we endorse Justice Powell’s view that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in
university admissions.” Id. at 325. In Bakke, Justice Powell had acknowledged
diversity as a compelling interest, but that point failed to obtain a majority of the
Court’s support. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).
223 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
224 See id. at 328 (“It is true that some language in those opinions might be
read to suggest that remedying past discrimination is the only permissible justification
for race-based governmental action.”).
217
218
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the policy: Racial inequity persists, and proactive measures of
racial justice are needed to address it.”225
In the 2013-2014 term, the Court examined whether the
University of Texas (UT) could justify the use of race in its
admissions process to attain a “critical mass” of minority
students for purposes of diversity.226 Fisher v. University of
Texas involves a white woman who claimed UT denied her
admission due to her race.227 UT employs a unique system in its
admissions process called the “Top Ten program,” where the
top 10% of every Texas high school’s graduating class
automatically gains admission to the school.228 As a product of
Texas’s highly de facto segregated public education system, the
Top Ten program has produced a nominally diverse class. Of
the freshman enrolled under the program in the fall of 2011,
26% were Hispanic and 6% were black.229 UT, however, did not
feel that these numbers constituted a sufficiently diverse class,
as “classes in many subjects have few or no minority
students.”230 It therefore instituted a program similar to what
the Supreme Court approved in Grutter, in which the
remaining quarter of the University’s freshman class is filled
using a system that takes the applicant’s race into account.231
At oral argument on October 10, 2013, Chief Justice
Roberts asked UT’s lawyers a question that they had difficulty
answering: “What is the critical mass of African-Americans and
Hispanics at the university that you are working toward?”232
Justice Kennedy appeared skeptical, noting that in his
judgment it seemed that race was the most important factor in
UT’s admissions process.233 In 2007, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Kennedy were part of a majority of the Court that
225 Julianne Hing, How Diversity Trumped Equity—and May Kill Affirmative
Action, COLORLINES (Oct. 10, 2012, 10:04 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/10/
how_diversity_trumped_equity—and_may_kill_affirmative_action.html.
226 Adam Liptak, Race and College Admissions, Facing a New Test by Justices,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
10/09/us/supreme-court-to-hear-case-on-affirmative-action.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
227 Id.
228 Id. (“Almost everyone calls this the Top Ten program, though the
percentage cutoff can vary.”).
229 To put it into perspective, Texas as a whole is thirty-eight percent Hispanic
and twelve percent black. Id.
230 Id.
231 Liptak, supra note 226; Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Race as Factor at
Universities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012 at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/10/11/us/a-changed-court-revisits-affirmative-action-in-college-admissions.html?
pagewanted=all.
232 Liptak, supra note 226.
233 Id.
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struck down a public school district’s use of race in its
admissions decisions because the consideration of race was not
narrowly tailored to its purported interest in diversity: “[R]ace,
for some students, was determinative standing alone” rather
than “part of a broader effort to achieve exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints . . . ”234
Although observers of the case, and particularly the oral
arguments, felt that the fate of diversity as a compelling state
interest was at risk,235 the Court’s decision disposed of the case
on much narrower grounds.236 Finding that the Fifth Circuit
did not fully perform the “searching examination” required of
strict scrutiny, in that it focused its decision on whether UT
introduced the program “in good faith” and not whether it was
narrowly tailored to compelling state interests, the Court
remanded the case to see whether the program could be justified
under true strict scrutiny.237 The Court reaffirmed its strict
analysis of race-based affirmative action programs and left the
question of diversity as a compelling interest to a later date.
IV.

QUASI-SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS: GENDER AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

The Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of
whether a gender-based affirmative action program violates the
equal protection clause.238 All but two of the federal appeals courts
that have addressed gender-based affirmative action have held
that these programs should be examined under the heightened
scrutiny standard.239 Despite a circuit split for over 20 years, the
234 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
723 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). The Court also
doubted the relevance of diversity as a compelling interest in the context of an
elementary or secondary school and limited Grutter to higher education. Id. (“In
upholding the admissions plan in Grutter, though, this Court relied upon
considerations unique to institutions of higher education . . . .”).
235 Liptak, supra note 7.
236 David H. Gans, The Long Wait Is Over: The Supreme Court Decides Fisher,
NAT’L CONST. CENTER (June 25, 2013), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2013/06/thelong-wait-is-over-the-supreme-court-decides-fisher/.
237 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420-21 (2013) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted).
238 Jason M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under
United States v. Virginia’s “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 1169, 1169 (1998).
239 See Berger Levinson, supra note 211, at 15-16. The exceptions are the
Federal Circuit and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 15. Based on Croson, the
Sixth Circuit held in Conlin v. Blanchard that in order for the state to employ a
remedial measure based on gender, it must satisfy strict scrutiny by showing that it
engaged in prior discrimination and that the remedy adopted is narrowly tailored to
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Court has not resolved the discrepancy, leaving scholars and
judges to guess what level of scrutiny a gender-based affirmative
action program demands under equal protection analysis.240
After Croson, when it became clear that strict scrutiny for
race meant that a race-based affirmative action program would
more likely be struck down than not, advocates of strict scrutiny
review for gender classifications were at a crossroads.241 “Many of
those who previously favored strict scrutiny for gender
classifications [became] concerned that such review would make it
much more difficult for the government to engage in affirmative
action to benefit women.”242 Settling on a heightened scrutiny
standard for gender has resulted in the constitutional quandary
that Justice Stevens cheerlessly identified in Adarand,243 and
which numerous commenters on the issue have echoed:
[T]he gender-based component of an affirmative action program may
survive challenge while the race-based component is held invalid. In
these courts, it is easier to invalidate measures intended to
remediate the arguably more serious, egregious racial discrimination
than the similar provisions intended to remediate gender
discrimination. Explaining this odd result, one lower court, while
“questioning [its] logic” pointed out that “the Supreme Court has
accepted the result that it is now more difficult to remedy race
discrimination than gender discrimination.”244

Some have suggested that Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion in United States v. Virginia pressed the heightened
scrutiny standard closer to strict scrutiny by using the phrase
“exceedingly persuasive justification” in place of the language
typically associated with heightened scrutiny: “substantially
related to important state interests.”245 Others argue just the
opposite: that “[m]ost appellate courts have not read [United

remedying that discrimination. Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1989).
In 2002, the Federal Circuit similarly held that an affirmative action program based on
gender would be judged under strict scrutiny. Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076,
1085 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
240 See generally Berger Levinson, supra note 211; Skaggs, supra note 238;
Galotto, supra note 120.
241 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 193, at 777.
242 Id.
243 See supra Part III.A.
244 Donna Meredith Matthews, Avoiding Gender Equality, 19 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 127, 145 (1998) (internal citation omitted).
245 See, e.g., Skaggs, supra note 238, at 1209 (“The ‘exceedingly persuasive
justification’ standard . . . represents the proper level of analysis for all gender-based
classifications, including gender-based affirmative action. This standard is demanding,
and many gender-based affirmative action plans that may have been permissible under
intermediate scrutiny are no longer valid.”).
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States v. Virginia] as altering the test, as the Court recited the
intermediate scrutiny standard while it stated that courts must
evaluate whether the proffered justification for a gender
classification is ‘exceedingly persuasive.’”246 Whether or not
United States v. Virginia changed the test for gender remains
to be seen, but many courts that have addressed a race-based
and gender-based affirmative action program in the same case
have struck down the one based on race and upheld the other
based on gender.247
In Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v.
City and County of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit looked at a
San Francisco ordinance that established a program requiring
each city department to set aside fixed amounts of its
“purchasing dollars” for minority-owned and women-owned
business enterprises (MBEs and WBEs, respectively).248 Much
like Richmond’s ordinance in Croson, the San Francisco
ordinance “require[d] each city department to establish [ ] yearly
goal[s] for the percentage of contracting dollars” that went to
MBEs and WBEs, and it set an overall goal of 30% of the city’s
contracting dollars to go to MBEs and 10% to WBEs.249 The court
judged the plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments against the
MBE and WBE classification schemes separately.250 Applying
strict scrutiny to the MBE preferences, the court recognized
that remedying past discrimination by the city of San Francisco
was a compelling interest.251 But the court found that the city
did not present any evidence of discrimination against MBEs
by city officials.252 The court ruled against the city; “on the basis

Berger Levinson, supra note 211, 11 n.81 (internal citations omitted).
Cf. Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pa., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d
990, 1009-11 (3d Cir. 1993) (reversing summary judgment invalidating MBE
preference in order to further investigate its narrow tailoring under strict scrutiny,
while upholding summary judgment striking down WBE preferences because city of
Philadelphia did not adequately put forward evidence of the existence of gender
discrimination in the construction industry. “[Heightened scrutiny] require[d] the City
to present probative evidence in support of its stated rationale for the gender
preference, discrimination against women-owned contractors.”).
248 Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 1987).
249 Id.
250 Id. at 928, 939.
251 Id. at 930.
252 Id. at 931. The city defended the program with statistics demonstrating the
“virtual exclusion of minority-owned and women-owned businesses from City
contracts.” Id. at 932 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The statistics reported
that although MBEs and WBEs accounted for thirty-three percent and twenty-five
percent of business in San Francisco, the city only awarded three percent of all
contracting to MBEs and WBEs. Id. at 932-33. The court found fault with the statistics
246

247
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of the record it had compiled, the city was not justified in
turning to such drastic remedies as bid preferences and setasides, at least not in the first instance.”253
Conversely, the court applied heightened scrutiny to the
ordinance’s WBE preference, just barely upholding it as an
acceptable use of gender under the Constitution.254 The court
held that the city was justified in “compensating women for
disadvantages they have suffered . . . [,]” suggesting that while
the goal of remedying societal discrimination is unacceptable
under strict scrutiny, it might be an acceptable government
interest under intermediate scrutiny.255 The court expressed
concern with the scope of the government’s interest, especially
considering that there might be industries in which women are
not discriminated256 and noted that “[t]he notion that women
need help in every business and profession is as pernicious and
offensive as its converse, that women ought to be excluded from
all enterprises because their place is in the home.”257
Nevertheless, “[u]nlike racial classifications, which must be
‘narrowly’ tailored to the government’s objective, there is no
requirement that gender-based statutes be drawn as precisely
as [they] might have been.”258 However, the court reserved the
right to step in when an affirmative action program benefited
women in “an industry where women are not disadvantaged.”259
Similarly, in Coral Construction Company v. King
County, the Ninth Circuit once again upheld an ordinance
as, in its judgment, they overestimated discrimination and the number of minorityand woman-owned businesses. Id. at 933.
253 Id. at 938.
254 Id. at 941-42 (“Although we find the city’s WBE preference troubling, we
uphold it against the challenge presented in this case . . . . The WBE program is
therefore substantially related to the city’s important goal of compensating women for
the disparate treatment they have suffered in the marketplace.” (emphasis omitted)
(internal citations omitted)).
255 Id. at 932, 941. Berger Levinson traces this back to Califano v. Webster,
where the Supreme Court upheld a social security provision “under which female wage
earners, for purposes of calculating retirement benefits, could exclude from the
computation of their average monthly wage three more lower-earning years than a male
wage earner.” Berger Levinson, supra note 211, at 8. The Court unanimously upheld the
law because it was intended to benefit women in order to “compensate for particular
economic disabilities suffered by women” in general. Id. (internal citation omitted).
256 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 813 F.2d at 932.
257 Id. at 941.
258 Id. at 941-42 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Coral Const. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 932 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Unlike the
strict standard of review applied to race-conscious programs, intermediate scrutiny
does not require any showing of governmental involvement, active or passive, in the
discrimination it seeks to remedy.”)
259 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 813 F.2d at 942.
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benefiting WBEs under heightened scrutiny while holding the
MBEs to strict scrutiny.260 The court reiterated that while,
under heightened scrutiny, the discrimination to be remedied
need not be the result of government action, “[s]ome degree of
discrimination must have occurred in a particular field before a
gender-specific remedy may be instituted in that field.”261 For
instance, the court upheld the statute on the basis of an
affidavit submitted by the female president of a consulting
engineering firm, which included her personal anecdotal
evidence of a discriminatory attitude toward women in the
engineering and construction business.262 She stated that only
seven percent of her firm’s business was derived from private
contracts, while the majority of her firm’s business was the
result of affirmative action set-asides.263
Jurisdictions employing both MBE and WBE programs
have seen, even in the same case, the former struck down
under a strict scrutiny standard and the latter upheld under
heightened scrutiny. This illustrates not only the disparity
between the two legal standards, but also the real-life
implications of classifying a group as suspect or quasi-suspect.
The lower the level of scrutiny associated with the group, the
more successful advocates have been in defending an
affirmative action program drawn for their benefit.
While the Supreme Court has found that diversity can be
a compelling state interest under limited circumstances for racebased affirmative action, it has not had the opportunity to weigh
in on whether diversity constitutes a significant or exceedingly
persuasive justification for a gender-based program.264
The notion that exposing minority and nonminority students to each
other will promote better understanding rings hollow in the context
of gender because males have mothers, sisters, female cousins,
aunts, and thus have numerous opportunities to interact with
women. As to education, Justice Ginsburg conceded . . . that genderbased affirmative action in education, unlike race-based affirmative
action, requires “altering recruitment patterns and eliminating
institutional practices that limit or discourage female participation,”
rather than a [diversity-based] special admissions program.265

260
261
262
263
264
265

Coral Const. Co., 941 F.2d 910 at 932-33.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 933.
Id.
Berger Levinson, supra note 211, at 24.
Id. at 24-25.
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Diversity-based justifications for gender classifications have not
effectively been tested under a heightened scrutiny standard. In
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission, however, the Court upheld a federal program
under heightened scrutiny that provided enhanced licenses to
minority-owned businesses in radio and television.266 The Court
upheld the use of race in that it was justified by the FCC’s
mission of “[s]afeguarding the public’s right to receive a diversity
of views and information over the airwaves.”267 In theory, a
diversity of viewpoints justification could translate to the
context of gender and justify a program benefiting women in
recruitment and retention.268
The Court has not examined an affirmative action
program under heightened scrutiny in recent years, leading to a
lack of consensus among Circuits and scholars over how to tailor
a gender-based affirmative action program that meets the
Supreme Court’s ever-vacillating conception of equal protection.
The fate of an LGBT affirmative program analyzed under
heightened protection would remain equally uncertain.
V.

SCRUTINIZING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BASED ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION

The Obama administration’s decision to argue for
heightened scrutiny for classifications based on sexual
orientation threatens the future viability of an affirmative
action program based on sexual orientation. For instance, what
would happen if Rutgers University, a public university in New
Jersey that has poured funding into LGBT outreach
programs,269 decided to create a “critical mass” of LGBT
students? Thus, as part of a “holistic” admissions process, it
begins to give a “plus” to students self-identifying as LGBT on
their admissions applications. It justifies its program on the
same basis that Elmhurst College justifies asking applicants
266 Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Metro Broadcasting
arrived after Croson but before Adarand, when the Court briefly entertained the idea
that Congress had greater authority to legislate based on race than did the States. Id.
at 565-66. It was overruled by Adarand’s insistence on a congruence rationale
requiring strict scrutiny for race-based classifications under federal law. Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
267 Metro Broad., 496 U.S. 547 at 567.
268 See Berger Levinson, supra note 211, at 26-27.
269 Ariel Kaminer, Since Suicide, More Resources for Transgender and Gay
Students, NY TIMES, Sept. 22, 2012 at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/09/22/nyregion/after-clementis-suicide-rutgers-embraces-its-gay-andtransgender-students.html.
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about sexual orientation: “A campus community that resembles
our diverse society and multicultural world” contributes to the
education of every student.270
This is essentially the “Harvard” plan at the center of
Grutter, which was upheld under a strict scrutiny analysis.271
But Grutter’s holding, especially the concepts of obtaining a
“critical mass” and diversity as a compelling interest, appeared
to be at risk during Fisher’s oral arguments.272 If a court
ultimately strikes down the University of Texas’s use of race as
not narrowly tailored, or it finds that diversity is no longer a
compelling interest for purposes of strict scrutiny, would
diversity still nonetheless qualify as a significant interest for
the purposes of heightened scrutiny? Would Metro
Broadcasting’s holding of viewpoint diversity as an important
interest justifying preferential treatment under heightened
scrutiny still hold water with the Court?
Even further, how would diversity as an interest
function under the rational basis test? Where the Court defers
to legislative findings under a rational basis regime, it becomes
difficult for it to dismiss a legislature’s decision to endorse the
findings of social scientists on the benefits of diversity.273
Remedying past discrimination would also likely be considered
a legitimate state interest, but the question then becomes what
sort of discrimination? Under strict scrutiny, a state actor must
have committed the discrimination, and the remedy must be
narrowly tailored to remedying that particular discriminatory
event.274 Under heightened scrutiny, however, remedying
societal, even private, discrimination is acceptable provided that
the state can show a history of discrimination in the particular
field of work affected by the legislation.275 Does it then follow
that remedying any and all societal discrimination against
LGBT individuals could constitute a legitimate state interest
under a rational basis analysis?276 Could an LGBT affirmative
Ray, supra note 59.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
272 See Philip T.K. Daniel & Scott Greytak, Commentary, Requiem for
Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Case Analysis Leading to a Fisher v.
University of Texas, 279 EDUC. L. REP. 539 (July 7, 2012).
273 See Berger Levinson, supra note 211, 24-26.
274 See supra Part III.
275 See supra Part IV.
276 A legislative body should have no trouble proving societal discrimination
against LGBT individuals. See, e.g., Jennifer C. Pizer, Brad Sears, Christy Mallory, &
Nan D. Hunter, Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against
LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and
Providing for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715 (2012).
270
271
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action program therefore pass constitutional muster under most
circumstances? There are seemingly few limiting factors.
In circuits that have not settled on heightened scrutiny
for classifications based on sexual orientation,277 the Supreme
Court’s relative silence on scrutiny for LGBT classifications
and Adarand’s demand for consistency among the applications
of scrutiny might lead a lower court to examine an LGBT
affirmative action program under a “rational basis with bite”
standard. However, the “bite” used in analyzing a
discriminatory law based on animus does not translate to the
context of an affirmative action program. The “bite” takes hold
when there is “a bare desire to . . . harm” a group of
individuals.278 The intent of an affirmative action program on
behalf of gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals in education
or employment would be to benefit those groups, and not to
harm heterosexuals.279
The current law of “rational basis with bite,” opens up
an array of options in crafting a constitutionally sound
affirmative action program, proving dangerous to conservative
opposition to affirmative action. The Court’s use of scrutiny as
a double-edged sword falters under “rational basis with bite”
because the so-called “bite” functions as a built-in judicial “oneway ratchet.”280 That is, because “rational basis with bite”
applies only when a “bare desire to do harm” is present, the
Court’s analysis should differ when rights are given to LGBT
individuals rather than when they are taken away. BLAG’s
position in favor of rational basis is untenable from a practical
standpoint. While a “rational basis with bite” approach has the
ability to strike down discriminatory laws, it is seemingly
toothless against laws that lack such a bare desire to do harm.
If the Supreme Court were to clearly hold that LGBT
classifications must be examined under “rational basis with
277 Currently, the Second and Ninth Circuits have elevated classifications
based on sexual orientation to a heightened scrutiny analysis. Windsor v. United
States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Lab., No.
11-17357, 2014 WL 211807 at *1 (9th Cir. 2014).
278 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
279 See also Note, The Benefits of Unequal Protection, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1348,
1365-66 (2013).
280 Ratchet theory suggests that some legal mechanisms can only work in
a single direction, for example “that Congress may enact laws that strengthen
guarantees under the Due Process and Equal Protections Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, . . . but may not dilute those guarantees.” Ratchet Theory
Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/r/ratchettheory/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
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bite” or a similar standard, conservatives would find
themselves in the precarious position of being stuck with a
level of scrutiny capable of striking down discriminatory laws
but seemingly powerless against sexual orientation-based
affirmative action programs. The Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the animus reasoning of Romer in striking down
Section 3 of DOMA under rational basis. Public opinion has
also shifted at a pace where discrimination against LGBT
individuals will not be tolerated by a majority of Americans for
much longer.281 “Rational basis with bite” has provided courts
with the power to strike down discriminatory laws but would
likely provide far fewer limits to legislatures crafting
affirmative action programs for gay and lesbian individuals.
On the other hand, if the Court endorses the view that
sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification, it would be
the step that commentators have anticipated since Romer.282
More significantly, however, it would make legislating by sexual
orientation more difficult, both discriminatorily and remedially.
Heightened scrutiny would strike down the same laws that
“rational basis with bite” now does, but under Adarand’s pillar
of consistency, heightened scrutiny would only leave room for
affirmative action programs supported by an “exceedingly
persuasive justification.” This added benefit of heightened
scrutiny should tempt opponents of affirmative action to come
out in support of this standard for LGBT classifications.
Indeed, opponents of affirmative action with the
foresight to realize that discriminatory laws against LGBT
individuals are due to expire would do well for themselves by
advocating for an across-the-board strict scrutiny standard for
race, gender, and sexual orientation. This position would
preserve the fewest options for crafting affirmative action
programs, with the added benefit of eliminating the paradox in
affirmative action jurisprudence allowing greater options for
legislating based on gender and sexual orientation. Otherwise,
the Court will continue to strike down discriminatory laws under
lesser standards with more limited power to strike down laws
employing benign classifications based on sexual orientation.

281 Public opinion has shifted in favor of gay marriage, and eighteen to
twenty-nine year olds overwhelmingly support it by a three to one margin. Public
Opinion on Gay Marriage, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Dec. 12, 2012, 1:01 AM),
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/55446668-82/marriage-court-gay-percent.html.csp.
282 See supra Part IV .
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CONCLUSION
Opponents of LGBT rights should ask themselves which
they fear more: nondiscrimination laws or affirmative action?
Although the Court continues to tread water over how to treat
LGBT classifications, some doubt the likelihood of an eventual
conservative win on the issue: “[Chief Justice] Roberts must
know that long before his tenure . . . is up in 25 years or so, any
decision by the court upholding bans on gay marriage will seem
retrograde and foolish.”283 The public opinion shift in favor of
LGBT nondiscrimination and equality is staggering, whether
or not the Court ultimately applies more heightened scrutiny to
LGBT classifications. Because under these circumstances
rational basis provides those opposed to LGBT affirmative
action the fewest comforts, the current position in favor of this
lesser review is short-sighted. Continued advocacy for such a
low standard of review for LGBT classifications will result in
the worst of both worlds for LGBT opponents: discriminatory
laws will continue to be struck down under the rational basis
with bite standard, while sexual orientation-based affirmative
action will be upheld under the same standard. Such advocates
truly find themselves between a rock and a hard place.
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